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HydraCode / Security Policy

Keep the private plane private.

HydraCode accepts responsible disclosure for vulnerabilities in the desktop app, the headless server, the iPhone and iPad app, the update chain, account access, and the account service and relay at code.hep.gg.

Effective date
October 8, 2026
Last updated
October 8, 2026

On this page

  1. 01Report privately
  2. 02Scope
  3. 03What happens next
  4. 04Update integrity
  5. 05Network boundary
  6. 06Account access and the relay
  7. 07Account security
  8. 08Out of scope

01

Report privately

Email support@teamhydra.dev with the affected versions, reproduction steps, the impact, and any proof of concept. Please do not access other users' data, disrupt the service, or publish an issue before it is fixed. Use your own account, your own machines and your own devices for testing.

support@teamhydra.dev

02

Scope

  • The HydraCode desktop app and the server built into it.
  • The headless HydraCode server (hydra) and its installer.
  • The HydraCode app for iPhone and iPad.
  • Releases and updates: the release feed, its signatures and the update process.
  • Server approval codes, authorized clients and the access tokens servers issue.
  • The account service at code.hep.gg: sign-in, phone sign-in codes, sessions, settings sync, the encrypted vault, server history sync, API keys, account access grants, the relay, push notifications, Live Activities and account deletion.
  • This website.

03

What happens next

We reply to confirm we have your report, keep you posted while we work on a fix, and tell you when it ships. If you would like credit, tell us the name to use. Once a fix is released, we are happy for you to publish your findings.

04

Update integrity

Headless servers update themselves from a signed release feed. Each release manifest is signed with Team Hydra's Ed25519 release key, which the server has built in, and the downloaded archive must match the SHA-256 digest in that manifest before it replaces the installed binary in one step. A manifest with a bad signature or an archive with the wrong digest is refused.

The desktop app installs only updates signed with the release key built into it. Releases are built and signed on Team Hydra's own build machines.

05

Network boundary

Direct connections use Tailscale first and private network addresses (RFC 1918, and IPv6 unique local addresses) second. Clients reject public IP addresses and arbitrary public endpoints, and the account service drops any other kind of address a machine advertises before a phone sees it.

The one public route is the relay at code.hep.gg, and it reaches only machines linked to the signed-in account, and only while the machine allows it.

06

Account access and the relay

A device signed in to an account can reach that account's machines, and only those, in two ways. There is no pairing: a machine joins an account only when someone signed in approves it.

Sealed access grants

For a direct connection the phone asks the account for a grant, sending a P-256 public key whose private key stays on the phone (in the Secure Enclave on devices that have one). The machine mints a single-use access code, valid for five minutes, and seals it to that key with ECDH, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM. The account service passes on only the sealed grant and cannot open it. The phone then redeems the code at the machine itself, which proves it can reach the machine directly.

The relay

When no direct route works, the phone connects to code.hep.gg instead. The account service checks that the machine belongs to the phone's account, is online and allows account access, then asks the machine to dial back. The machine opens its own connection for each relayed socket, authenticated with its own account session and a one-time 32-byte secret; the service accepts each tunnel once, only with the matching secret and only from that machine's session. Both legs use TLS. The relay is not end-to-end encrypted: code.hep.gg passes the traffic along in memory and does not store it. Relayed devices get the standard paired permissions only, so they can never create access codes or manage other clients.

Adding a machine

A server that is not on an account yet (hydra account link, which the installer runs) asks code.hep.gg for an eight-character approval code and shows it. Someone signed in looks the code up on any of their devices, sees the server's name, kind, platform, version and how long ago it asked, and approves or denies it. The code is single use, lives ten minutes and is stored only as a SHA-256; a denial and an expiry are final. Until the approval the server learns nothing about the account, and only the server holding the request's own random poll token receives the account session. Making codes, polling and looking codes up are rate limited per address and per account, and repeated wrong codes pause lookups.

Controls and records

  • Each machine has a switch, "Let devices on my account connect to this computer" in the desktop app (Settings, Connections) or accountAccess.enabled in a server's settings.json. Off, it refuses grants and relayed connections, closes relayed connections and suspends every session the account issued there.
  • Revoking a device in a machine's Authorized clients blocks it on that machine until you allow it again.
  • Signing a phone out, or revoking its session on code.hep.gg/account, closes its relayed connections and asks every online machine to revoke what that session was given.
  • Grants and relayed connections are rate limited and recorded in access records kept for 90 days (see the privacy policy).

07

Account security

  • Session tokens, API keys, sign-in links and phone sign-in codes are stored only as SHA-256 hashes.
  • Sign-in with Hep.gg uses the OAuth authorization code flow with PKCE, and needs a verified email address.
  • Phone sign-in codes are eight characters, single use, valid for five minutes, and limited per address and across the service to stop guessing.
  • The web account page keeps its session in an HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict cookie that scripts cannot read, accepted only by the account page's own routes, and every change it makes needs a header other sites cannot send.
  • The encrypted vault is encrypted on your device with a key derived from your recovery passphrase. The service stores only the encrypted result.
  • Provider credentials, SSH keys and access tokens are never synced as account settings.

08

Out of scope

Provider platforms (OpenAI, Anthropic), Tailscale, Apple's services, operating systems and Git hosts are outside HydraCode's disclosure scope; please report issues in them to their maintainers. Denial of service, spam, social engineering and physical attacks are out of scope too.

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